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I. INTRODUCTION  
Suppose an asylum seeker is denied asylum by an immigration judge and, 
on appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirms that denial. The asylum 
seeker then raises multiple grounds for relief in a petition for review in federal 
court, and the court agrees on some but not all of those grounds, ultimately 
reversing the BIA. Has the asylum seeker prevailed, and if so, was the 
government’s opposition “substantially justified”? Under the Equal Access to 
Justice Act,1 if the answers to those two questions are yes and no, respectively, 
the asylum seeker is entitled to have their fees and expenses paid by the 
government. 
Whether the government’s opposition was substantially justified is the 
subject of a circuit split, as Professor Jayanth Krishnan explains in Lawyers for 
the Undocumented: Addressing a Split Circuit Dilemma for Asylum-Seekers. 
Some courts take the position that the government’s opposition can be 
substantially justified even if it loses, so long as the “totality” of its arguments 
are reasonable; other courts disagree. Professor Krishnan argues that the latter 
group of decisions are better reasoned because “[i]n reality, the government only 
had one steadfast position throughout the litigation: to reject the non-citizen’s 
petition for asylum. When the government opted not to challenge that issue on 
appeal, it lost. Period.”2 As a result, the asylum seeker should recover “full legal 
fees under the EAJA.”3 
 
  Professor of Law, Lewis & Clark Law School. Thanks to Professor Krishnan for the 
invitation to respond, and to Colin Bradshaw (‘21) for excellent research assistance. 
 1 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (2019). 
 2 Jayanth K. Krishnan, Lawyers for the Undocumented: Addressing a Circuit Split 
Dilemma for Asylum Seekers, 82 OHIO ST. L.J. 163, 183 (2021).  
 3 Id. at 184. 
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In this short response to Lawyers for the Undocumented, I don’t disagree 
that an asylum seeker who wins relief is the prevailing party, even if only one 
of many arguments raised was accepted by the courts. I part ways with Professor 
Krishnan on whether losing arguments play any role whatsoever in the amount 
of attorneys’ fees that the prevailing asylum seeker should recover; he says not 
at all, while I say, not so fast. In short, Professor Krishnan focuses on the 
“substantially justified” element of the EAJA to conclude that attorneys’ fees 
should be shifted but does not address the statute’s limitation of such fees to 
“reasonable” ones; I argue that losing arguments might be (but are not 
necessarily) the result of unreasonable litigation and are thus potentially relevant 
to the amount of fees that the prevailing asylum seeker should obtain. 
II. ARGUMENT IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
The impetus for Lawyers for the Undocumented is the Fifth Circuit’s recent 
decision in W.M.V.C. v. Barr,4 in which a Honduran mother and daughter pair 
appealed the immigration judge’s and the Board of Immigration Appeals’ denial 
of their asylum claim. Before the Fifth Circuit, the asylum seekers argued that, 
among other errors, the BIA failed to address all of their arguments. The 
government did not defend the BIA’s ruling on the merits; instead, it “moved to 
remand to consider the issues raised in petitioners’ opening brief [while] 
insist[ing] that its motion was not a concession of error . . . .”5 When the 
petitioners then sought attorneys’ fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 
the Fifth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, held that the government’s position was 
substantially justified because it prevailed on five of the eight arguments raised 
by the petitioners. The dissenting judge argued that the government’s position 
was not substantially justified because the petitioners “prevailed on their 
petition for review.”6 
The crux of Professor Krishnan’s analysis is that argument in the alternative 
is a time-honored litigation strategy. He cites approvingly Judge King’s dissent 
in W.M.V.C., in which she quoted a D.C. Circuit case: “[L]itigation is not an 
exact science. In some cases, the lawyer’s flagship argument may not carry the 
day, while the court embraces a secondary argument the lawyer rated less 
favorably.”7 
It is a truism that a lawyer can never be sure which argument will prevail on 
a matter and, therefore, a lawyer might not want to rely on a single argument 
when there are multiple ones that could be raised. On the other hand, there are 
tactical reasons for a lawyer not to raise every conceivable argument. Alex 
Kozinski, a former Ninth Circuit judge, once gave tongue-in-cheek advice about 
how to lose an appeal, and one of the suggestions was to “bury your winning 
 
 4 W.M.V.C. v. Barr, 926 F.3d 202 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 5 Id. at 207. 
 6 Id. at 214 (King, J., dissenting). 
 7 Id. at 216. 
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argument among nine or ten losers.”8 James McElhaney, who wrote a long-time 
column on litigation and evidence for the ABA Journal, gave similar advice: 
 Never make a dishonest argument, an inapt analogy or an unfair 
comparison. If you do, the reader can’t trust you or what you have to say. 
 That is why you need to get rid of every weak argument you have. Weak 
arguments reflect on the credibility of the writer, so they drag the entire brief 
down to their level.9 
Thus, effective lawyering does not always mean raising every conceivable 
argument that one can think of; frivolous, ridiculous, and even weak arguments 
should be eliminated from briefing. To be sure, I’m not suggesting that 
Professor Krishnan or Judge King are actually arguing in favor of intentionally 
making bad arguments. However, the rule propounded by Judge King’s 
dissent—and by extension, Professor Krishnan’s article—is that a prevailing 
asylum seeker is entitled to full recovery of attorneys’ fees so long as the asylum 
seeker wins asylum. After all, Judge King cited Hensley v. Eckerhart10 
approvingly for the proposition that “[l]itigants in good faith may raise 
alternative legal grounds for a desired outcome, and the court’s rejection 
of . . . certain grounds is not a sufficient reason for reducing a fee.”11 Perhaps 
Judge King meant that losing arguments were a necessary but insufficient basis 
for reducing the award of attorneys’ fees to prevailing plaintiffs, but the next 
sentence in her opinion suggests otherwise: “The result is what matters.”12 
In Part IV.C. of Lawyers for the Undocumented, Professor Krishnan 
provides additional reasoning to bolster his and Judge King’s position, relying 
on Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger,13 in which the Supreme Court 
characterized prevailing plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fee provisions as a type of 
sanction for bad faith or abusive conduct by a litigant. In that case, plaintiffs 
settled a protracted products liability case and then discovered through 
newspaper reports that Goodyear had, in an unrelated case, produced test results 
that the Haegers had requested repeatedly in discovery and failed to receive. The 
Haegers then asked for sanctions against Goodyear for discovery fraud, which 
the district court granted in the amount of $2.7 million—an amount representing 
the total amount of legal fees and costs that the Haegers had incurred throughout 
the litigation. The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the district court 
had improperly awarded sanctions beyond the “bad-faith acts on which [they 
were] based.” Instead, the Court explained that a court engaging in fee shifting 
as a sanction must “establish a causal link—between the litigant’s misbehavior 
 
 8 Alex Kozinski, The Wrong Stuff, 1992 BYU L. REV. 325, 327 (1992). 
 9 James W. McElhaney, Legal Writing that Works, ABA J. (July 1, 2007), 
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/legal_writing_that_works. 
 10 Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983). 
 11 Id. (emphasis added). 
 12 Id.  
 13 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 137 S. Ct. 1178 (2017). 
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and legal fees paid by the opposing party.” Rather than the full $2.7 million they 
spent in attorneys’ fees on the case, the Haegers were entitled only to the amount 
spent in litigating access to the test results.  
Professor Krishnan argues that where an asylum seeker prevails in 
litigation, the government’s misbehavior consists of opposing the asylum 
petition in the first place, and, therefore, he reads Goodyear as requiring the 
government to pay for the attorneys’ fees that the asylum seeker incurred in 
litigating that opposition: “[T]he following presumption should be employed 
going forward: where the government loses at the merits-phase of an asylum 
hearing, it will be obliged to reimburse the non-citizen for legal fees.”  
This presumption is based on his observation that in the “vast majority of 
precedent discussed [earlier in the article] . . . the government’s opposition has 
not been substantially justified.”14 But this presumption seems to rely on a bit 
of a tautology: because the courts have frequently found the government’s 
position in the asylum cases not to be substantially justified, we should presume 
the government’s position not to be substantially justified in all cases going 
forward where it loses on the merits. Our legal system generally doesn’t penalize 
a litigant by presuming an element of a cause of action against them due to their 
having lost that same element repeatedly in unrelated litigation.15 On the other 
hand, perhaps this is meant to be a rebuttable presumption. If so, however, it is 
difficult to see what the presumption adds. If the government loses, then the 
asylum seeker has prevailed and is entitled to attorneys’ fees unless the 
government can show that its position was substantially justified; in other 
words, the government already bears the burden of proving that its position was 
substantially justified. 
III. REASONABLE AND UNREASONABLE LOSING ARGUMENTS 
Although Goodyear supports Professor Krishnan’s position to make the 
government pay for a prevailing asylum seeker’s attorneys’ fees as 
compensation for wrongly denying asylum, it also supports denying those fees 
for unreasonable arguments. The Court explained that the causal link between 
misbehavior and legal fees means that sanctions are appropriate only for legal 
costs related to the misconduct, as opposed to the entire litigation. It used Fox 
v. Vice as an example: 
[A] prevailing defendant sought reimbursement under a fee-shifting statute for 
legal expenses incurred in defending against several frivolous claims. The trial 
 
 14 Krishnan, supra note 2, at 195. 
 15 Perhaps the closest analogy is the ability of a court to declare someone a “vexatious 
litigant” based on past “abuse of process,” in which case a court might require the vexatious 
litigant to put up security to guarantee payment of any sanctions that might be imposed for 
subsequent misconduct. See, e.g., L.R. 83-8 C. D. Cal.. But even that local rule does not 
presume that the vexatious litigant’s subsequent litigation is sanctionable once they lose on 
the merits.  
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court granted fees for all legal work relating to those claims—regardless of 
whether the same work would have been done (for example, the same 
depositions taken) to contest the non-frivolous claims in the suit. We made 
clear that was wrong.16 
The key point is that the wronged party is not necessarily entitled to 
compensation for all of its fees incurred, only those incurred because of the other 
side’s frivolous or abusive conduct. This also suggests that compensation should 
not extend to the prevailing party’s own frivolous or unreasonable positions 
because these are not appropriate responses. Here it is worthwhile to observe 
that the Equal Access to Justice Act limits recovery to “reasonable attorney 
fees.”17 
As a counterexample, what if a non-citizen is forced to litigate entitlement 
to asylum and raises a number of arguments, one of which directly contradicts 
binding Supreme Court precedent. A zealous advocate could plausibly include 
such an argument to preserve the issue for appeal, but it would be unreasonable 
to devote any more time to researching the issue or drafting and editing lengthy 
analysis and argument for a lower court once the advocate discovered the 
adverse controlling authority; after all, the Supreme Court has on multiple 
occasions reminded the Courts of Appeals pointedly that it alone can overrule 
one of its precedents.18 Under Professor Krishnan’s approach, though, the 
asylum seeker would be able to recover all of the attorneys’ fees expended in 
this quixotic effort. This is, admittedly, an extreme example, but it is not the 
only way in which part of a plaintiff’s litigation effort might be unworthy of fee-
shifting. 
Other well-known fee-shifting statutory provisions, such as 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1988 for civil rights actions and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) for Title VII actions, 
would not yield the same result as that suggested by Professor Krishnan with 
regard to the Equal Access to Justice Act. These fee-shifting provisions serve 
the same purpose as the EAJA: “to encourage meritorious civil rights 
litigation.”19 However, they award reasonable attorneys’ fees for prevailing 
plaintiffs. Note the qualification of “reasonable” fees, as well as “meritorious” 
litigation. The prevailing civil rights plaintiff gets an award of attorneys’ fees 
from the defendant, but it might well be less than 100 percent of what was 
sought.  
The basic principle is well-stated by Coutin v. Young & Rubicam P.R.: “If 
a prevailing party is successful on all (or substantially all) of her claims, . . . it 
goes without saying that reasonable fees should be paid for time productively 
 
 16 Haeger, 137 S. Ct. at 1187 (citing Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 830, 836 (2011)). 
 17 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (2019). 
 18 Bosse v. Oklahoma, 137 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2016); United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557, 
567 (2001); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997); Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989). 
 19 Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy Indus., 728 F.2d 820, 829 (7th Cir. 1984). 
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spent, without any discount for limited success,”20 the key being “time 
productively spent.” Time spent on a losing argument might have been 
productive – or it might have been unproductive. Much as they do when fee-
shifting under Title VII or section 1988, courts are able to determine if 
unsuccessful claims and arguments were frivolous, and there is no reason to 
doubt that the same would be true for asylum claims under the EAJA. 
IV. THE NITTY-GRITTY DETAILS OF APPORTIONING FEES 
How do courts limit fees under Title VII or section 1988 when there are 
multiple arguments? One representative case is Diaz v. Jiten Hotel 
Management, Inc., in which the plaintiff brought six employment-related 
claims, eventually prevailing on a count of discrimination under state law. Of 
the other five claims, she dismissed three voluntarily (which the district court 
interpreted as her concession that they were not viable), the defendant obtained 
summary judgment on another because it was preempted, and the remaining 
unsuccessful claim (discrimination under federal law) was rejected by the jury.21 
The plaintiff prevailed and sought attorneys’ fees under the state law-equivalent 
to Title VII for the full amount of time spent by her attorney on the case. The 
district court, however, reduced the amount sought by two-thirds because four 
of the six claims were unviable, and “[h]ours spent working on such untenable 
claims ‘cannot be deemed to have been “expended in pursuit of the ultimate 
result achieved.”‘“22 At the same time, the district court awarded attorneys’ fees 
for time spent on the federal discrimination claim even though it failed before 
the jury, because it “was largely based on the same core of facts as the successful 
state age discrimination claim.”23 In short, the losing claims were not irrelevant 
to the amount of attorneys’ fees that the plaintiff was entitled to, but nor were 
they dispositive. The unreasonable lost claims resulted in no fee award, but the 
reasonable one did.24 
Ideally, the asylum seeker’s lawyer would submit sufficiently detailed 
billing records so that the reviewing court would be able to determine the 
amount of time spent on the unreasonable arguments and exclude that time from 
the fee-shifting calculation. In practice, however, billing records are unlikely to 
be that detailed. In analogous instances involving a mixture of reasonable and 
unreasonable claims, courts have roughly apportioned time equally to each 
claim; thus, in Diaz, the district court, having concluded that two of the six 
claims were tenable and four were not, awarded one-third the amount sought. 
 
 20 Coutin v. Young & Rubicam P.R.,124 F.3d 331, 339 (1st Cir. 1997). 
 21 Diaz v. Jiten Hotel Mgmt., Inc., 762 F. Supp. 2d 74, 80 (D. Mass. 2011). 
 22 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 23 Id. 
 24 For another entertaining example, see Murray v. Mills, 354 F. Supp. 2d 231 
(E.D.N.Y. 2005), in which the prevailing plaintiff’s lawyer sought to be paid for the 1320.1 
hours that he claimed to have spent to obtain a temporary restraining order. The court reduced 
the hours to 156.9 and cut the hourly rate sought by almost two-thirds. 
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In some instances, a judge might well conclude that such rough 
apportionment would shortchange the asylum seeker because the amount of 
time spent on the unreasonable or frivolous argument was, in the judge’s 
assessment, much less than that spent on other arguments. The judge should of 
course feel free to adjust the fees as would be appropriate without following 
rigid apportionment. Even in such an instance, though, it is apparent that losing 
(and frivolous or unreasonable) arguments play an important role in determining 
the amount of fees to be shifted; at a minimum, they can serve as a starting point 
in apportionment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Professor Krishnan is surely correct in arguing that the determination of 
substantial justification of the government’s position in an asylum case should 
be based on the overall outcome, not the individual arguments. But a prevailing 
plaintiff and a lack of substantial justification of the government’s position led 
to an award of reasonable attorneys’ fees, not any and all fees. The 
reasonableness of the attorneys’ fee award is a separate determination from the 
entitlement to such fees in the first place, and losing arguments can—and 
should—play a role in determining the former. 
 
